In this paper, I explain two puzzles" which h a ve been observed in rm level data.
Introduction
In this paper, I provide an explanation for two apparently counter-intuitive empirical regularities: 1 Firms which primarily rely on internal funds to increase investment usually have access to external funds which they do not use; and 2 Firms which appear to be severely liquidity constrained and without any discernable sources of external nance display v ery little correlation between their internal resources and investment Kaplan and Zingales 1997.
The above evidence has been used by Kaplan and Zingales henceforth KZ to argue against a large body of literature on investment which s a ys that additional explanatory power provided by cash ow in a regression of investment against Tobin's q is an indicator of liquidity constraints. For example, Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson 1988 henceforth FHP found that the sensitivity o f i n vestment to cash ow was much higher for rms which w ere a priori expected to be liquidity constrained according to some other criteria. In a sample of 422 U.S. rms from the Value Line database, a sub-sample of 49 rms with dividend income ratios less than 0.1 displays a m uch higher correlation between investment and cash ow than the remaining rms with higher dividend to income ratios. This nding has been replicated for several data sets and sample splits. 1 KZ demonstrate that if the sub-sample of 49 rms is further divided into constrained and unconstrained rms, the investment expenditure of the former category is less sensitive to cash ow than that of the latter category. This sub-division is done on the basis of a detailed examination of the rms' annual reports, letters to shareholders, statements by the management, entries in The Wall Street Journal Index etc.
Firms which document di culties in obtaining external funds, have been forced to cut dividends or are renegotiating debt repayments are classi ed as constrained. On the other hand, rms with low debt, unused lines of credit, large amounts of internal funds and collateralizable resources are considered unconstrained.
In what follows, I shall argue that a high sensitivity o f i n vestment to cash ow is an indicator of liquidity constraints. However, the reverse is not necessarily true,
i.e. liquidity constraints do not necessarily imply sensitivity o f i n vestment to cash ow. In other words, KZ's identi cation of rms with unused credit lines and high investment-cash ow sensitivities as unconstrained is erroneous. However, as they document, it is not necessary for investment and cash ow of constrained rms to be correlated.
I use a dynamic model of rm investment with liquidity constraints and non convex costs of adjustment of capital which explains the KZ results. I show that for some rms, the existence of unutilized lines of credit is compatible with the presence of liquidity constraints. Such rms display a high sensitivity o f i n vestment to cash ow. On the other hand, xed costs of adjustment of capital interact with the liquidity constraints, implying that investment cannot increase with marginal increases in cash ow for some rms. The increase in cash ow m a y not be adequate to cover the xed cost of changing the capital stock and the rm may be unable to borrow. Cash ow, therefore, has to be above a certain threshold level for these rms to display a positive relationship between investment and cash ow.
I conclude therefore, that disregarding issues involved in the measurement o f q, the FHP methodology, based on the sensitivity o f i n vestment to cash ow, provides a useful way to distinguish between constrained and unconstrained rms. However, within the group of liquidity constrained rms, some rms may display l o wer investment-cash ow sensitivities, depending on other factors such as adjustment costs technologies.
The paper is organized as follows. In what follows, I shall study the implications of each of these types of costs for the sensitivity o f i n vestment to nancial resources for various types of rms.
Financial Constraints
I also assume two t ypes of nancial constraints which are imposed on the rm. First the rm is not allowed to issue fresh equity, 4 i.e. dividends are always constrained to 4 External nance is typically more expensive than internal nance. Asymmetric information between investors and managers leads the former to demand an equity premium Myers Financial resources x t are de ned as the sum of pro ts and undepreciated capital less debt repayments in the current period, i.e.
To prevent rms from borrowing more than an amount they can repay in the next period, the borrowing limit is related to the rms nancial condition. A rm can only borrow up to the point which ensures that it can repay its debt with certainty in the next period. 5 B t+1 must therefore satisfy the following condition:
Mi n x t+1 jx t 0 or K t+1 + 1 , K t+1 , 1 + rB t+1 jx t 0 7 5 Alburquerque & Hopenhayn 1997 derive constrained e cient debt contracts in a partial equilibrium framework. I chose to work with the tightest possible constraint and show that rms will still have u n used lines of credit.
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The structure of information and decision making in the model is as follows: Firms enter any period t with a given capital stock K t and debt B t . They observe the value of the shock at time t, which determines their nancial resources x t . Given this value of x t and the constraints they face, the rms choose their capital stock K t+1 , and debt B t+1 , for the next period. The parameter values used in this simulation are given below: Since the probability distribution is discretized, the bounds ; are taken as , 3 ; + 3 .
Similar results obtain for log normal distributions with a lower bound of zero.
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The value of used is consistent with a discount rate of 2 percent. All other parameters except the cost of adjustment are based on the parameters estimated in
Pratap & Rend on 1998. Since lenders do not bear any risk in lending to the rm, the rate of interest is the same as the discount rate. The cost of adjustment parameter is based on Abel & Eberly 1996 who estimate that costs of adjustment are roughly equal to 1.1 of investment in the manufacturing sector. 7 Figure 1 shows the policy rules as a function of the state x t , for given levels of K t .
Three patterns of capital accumulation can be observed, depending on the level of It is worth emphasizing the roles played by adjustment costs and liquidity con- Choosing an appropriate adjustment cost parameter is di cult, since most available estimates are based on smooth adjustment costs and are implausibly high Chirinko 1993. For example, the lowest estimate Schaller 1981 gets is 28.6 after allowing for heterogeneity a s w ell as imperfect competition. Goolsbee & Gross 1997 use non parametric methods to show that if they aggregate capital to the rm level, their estimates are biased upwards and evidence of non convexities disappear. 8 This policy rule is shown for a given value of K t : Higher values of K t leave the shape of the policy function unchanged but shift x to the right. straints respectively, in producing this type of investment dynamics. Without liquidity constraints, this model would be equivalent to Caballero and Leahy 1996.
Investment w ould follow a n S; s rule, i.e. there would be two threshold levels of for investment. Firms with capital stock below the lower threshold would invest, and those with capital stock a b o ve the other would disinvest. In Figure 1 , however, we consider investment for a given K t and for di erent v alues of x t or equivalently, for di erent v alues of t and B t . Without liquidity constraints, investment w ould be completely insensitive t o x t . In other words, rms with x t x would borrow o r issue equity to be reach their optimal level of K t+1 , which w ould depend solely on K t . F or a given value of K t , the rms' nancial position would be irrelevent.
On the other hand with only liquidity constraints and no adjustment costs of capital, rms would invest incremental increases in their cash ow. For rms with x t x investment w ould be a monotonically increasing function of x t , regardless of the value of K t . The zone of insensitivity for x t x would disappear. The interaction of liquidity constraints and xed costs of adjustment produces the dynamics we observe in Figure 1 .
The same gure also shows us debt as a function of x t . Firms with nancial resources below x cannot incur any debt. For rms with x t x , debt is an inverted U shaped function of nancial resources. If rms did not face a borrowing constraint, this function would be monotonically declining, since poorer rms would need to borrow more than rich rms to reach their desired level of capital. However, since the amount a rm can borrow is limited by its nancial position, increases in x t allow a rm to borrow more and increase its capital stock. This accounts for the upward sloping part of the curve. When x t is large enough rms can borrow an amount such that they can instantaneously reach their desired level of capital, regardless of the value of current nancial resources. For these rms, debt is a decreasing function of x t . Figure 2 shows rms debt as compared to their credit ceiling. The interesting feature here is the existence of unused credit lines even for rms whose investment i s sensitive to cash ow. This is because in addition to the borrowing constraint, the rm also faces a non negativity constraint on its dividends. Higher borrowing today would result in lower x tomorrow and the rm would have to borrow more in the next period so that it does not violate the dividend constraint. This amount of borrowing could violate the borrowing constraint tomorrow.
Kaplan and Zingales argue that these rms cannot be considered liquidity constrained since they are in a position to increase investment if they choose, as evidenced by their unused credit lines. However, these rms are de nitely constrained in a dynamic sense since considerations of future constraints a ect their borrowing in the current period.
In the context of the model, liquidity constrained rms have been de ned as rms whose capital stock is below the desired level of capital. Figure 3 shows the slope of the value function with respect to x t , i.e. the shadow v alue of internal nancial resources. This value is greater than 1 for all rms with x t x , which includes both rms whose investment is unresponsive to increases in cash ow i.e. rms with x t x and rms which display sensitivity o f i n vestment to cash ow i.e. 
Convex Costs of Adjustment
To contrast my ndings with the conventional smooth adjustment costs, I also present simulations of the model with convex adjustment costs 4 9 The policy rules can now be written as: 9 The parameters are the same as used in the previous simulation.
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K t+1 = Kx t ; K t B t+1 = Bx t ; K t Figure 4 shows the optimal capital stock as a function of x t for di erent v alues of K t . 10 Since the costs of adjustment are incremental in nature, there is no region of unresponsiveness to increases in x t for liquidity constrained rms. The policy function shifts upwards for higher values of K t since adjusting capital becomes cheaper as K t increases. Figure 5 shows the policy rule for B t+1 as a function of x t for di erent v alues of K t : The policy rule is still maintains the same inverted U shape and shifts upwards for higher values of K t .
As expected, rms with unused credit lines still display sensitivity o f i n vestment to cash ow, since this result does not depend on the nature or presence of adjustment costs. However, the investment of all liquidity constrained rms is sensitive to cash ow. In other words, Figure 4 does not have the zone of insensitivity o f i n vestment to x t for some liquidity constrained rms that Figure 1 does. for more than 80 of the sample period. Group 2 comsists of rms with x t x for at least 80 of the sample period.
Reduced Form Investment Equations
In this section I simulate a panel of 500 rms for 20 years to estimate cross sectional investment equations. This data is generated from the model with xed costs and the liquidity constraints described above. The parameters are the same as were used to simulate the policy rules. The purpose of this exercise is to see whether data generated by the model can be split in a manner as to replicate the FHP and KZ results simultaneously.
The rst sample split, in the spirit of FHP, i s b e t ween rms whose internal nancial resources x t are less than x for more than 80 of the sample period Group 1, and those for which x t x for more than 80 of the sample period Group 2. Summary statistics for each of these subgroups of rms are presented in Table 1 .
As the table shows, Group 1 rms invest more, pay l o wer dividends and have a show a n y relationship between x t and investment.
The coe cient on the nancial variable x t is almost 1 for Group 1 rms. 13 . Since Slack is de ned as the di erence between the credit ceiling and actual borrowing. 13 If I exclude rms with x t x the coe cient is greater than 1 because increases in x also allow the rm to borrow. Firms which borrow upto their credit limit for at least 80 of the sample period are included in Group 1a the counterpart of the liquidity constrained rms in the KZ scheme while rms with some available credit comprise Group 1b. Table 3 shows summary statistics for these rms.
Group 1a rms have several features which are very similar to the rms identi ed as liquidity constrained by KZ. They tend to have l o wer investment and lower slack than Group 1b rms. Since they have access to fewer external resources, they are unable to borrow a s m uch. They also have a l o wer level of nancial resources, and pay less dividends than Group 1b rms.
The corresponding investment equations for both these groups are presented in measure of q contains some measurement error, the cash ow v ariable captures some of the investment opportunites which are not contained in q. Table 4 .
The coe cient o n x t for Group 1a rms is 0.23. This is well within the range of the corresponding KZ estimates which v ary from 0.14 to 0. I show that while the sensitivity o f i n vestment to cash ow implies that a rm is liquidity constrained, the reverse may not necessarily be true. Liquidity constrained rms prefer to use internal funds for investment and borrow below their credit limit to guard against violating future constraints, and may t h us display a high sensitivity of investment to cash ow and unused lines of credit simultaneously.
Similarly, the interaction of xed costs of adjustment and liquidity constraints implies that, for some rms, increases in cash ow are not adequate to cover both investment expenditure and the xed cost of changing the capital stock. Investment responds to increases in cash ow only when a rm is wealthy enough to a ord both these components of investment.
Therefore, investment-cash ow sensitivities still provide a useful way to distinguish between liquidity constrained and unconstrained rms. However, investment may be relatively insensitive to cash ow for a certain subset of constrained rms due to non convexities in the adjustment cost technology. High K(t) Low K(t)
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